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Abstract
Active inference is a Bayesian framework for understanding biological intelligence.
The underlying theory brings together perception and action under one single
imperative: minimizing free energy. However, despite its theoretical utility in
explaining intelligence, computational implementations have been restricted to low-
dimensional and idealized situations. In this paper, we present a neural architecture
for building deep active inference agents operating in complex, continuous state-
spaces using multiple forms of Monte-Carlo (MC) sampling. For this, we introduce
a number of techniques, novel to active inference. These include: i) selecting free-
energy-optimal policies via MC tree search, ii) approximating this optimal policy
distribution via a feed-forward ‘habitual’ network, iii) predicting future parameter
belief updates using MC dropouts and, finally, iv) optimizing state transition
precision (a high-end form of attention). Our approach enables agents to learn
environmental dynamics efficiently, while maintaining task performance, in relation
to reward-based counterparts. We illustrate this in a new toy environment, based
on the dSprites data-set, and demonstrate that active inference agents automatically
create disentangled representations that are apt for modeling state transitions.
In a more complex Animal-AI environment, our agents (using the same neural
architecture) are able to simulate future state transitions and actions (i.e., plan),
to evince reward-directed navigation - despite temporary suspension of visual
input. These results show that deep active inference – equipped with MC methods –
provides a flexible framework to develop biologically-inspired intelligent agents,
with applications in both machine learning and cognitive science.
1 Introduction
A common goal in cognitive science and artificial intelligence is to emulate biological intelligence, to
gain new insights into the brain and build more capable machines. A widely-studied neuroscience
proposition for this is the free-energy principle, which views the brain as a device performing varia-
tional (Bayesian) inference [1, 2]. Specifically, this principle provides a framework for understanding
biological intelligence, termed active inference, by bringing together perception and action under
a single objective: minimizing free energy across time [3–7]. However, despite the potential of
active inference for modeling intelligent behavior, computational implementations have been largely
restricted to low-dimensional, discrete state-space tasks [8–11].
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Recent advances have seen deep active inference agents solve more complex, continuous state-space
tasks, including Doom [12], the mountain car problem [13–15], and several tasks based on the
MuJoCo environment [16], many of which use amortization to scale-up active inference [13–15, 17].
A common limitation of these applications is a deviation from vanilla active inference in their ability
to plan. For instance, Millidge [17] introduced an approximation of the agent’s expected free energy
(EFE), the quantity that drives action selection, based on bootstrap samples, while Tschantz et al. [16]
employed a reduced version of EFE. Additionally, since all current approaches tackle low-dimensional
problems, it is unclear how they would scale up to more complex domains. Here, we propose an
extension of previous formulations that is closely aligned with active inference [4, 9] by estimating
all EFE summands using a single deep neural architecture.
Our implementation of deep active inference focuses on ensuring both scalability and biological
plausibility. We accomplish this by introducing MC sampling – at several levels – into active inference.
For planning, we propose the use of MC tree search (MCTS) for selecting a free-energy-optimal
policy. This is consistent with planning strategies employed by biological agents and provides
an efficient way to select actions. Next, we approximate the optimal policy distribution using a
feed-forward ‘habitual’ network. This is inspired by biological habit formation, when acting in
familiar environments that relieves the computational burden of planning in commonly-encountered
situations. Additionally, for both biological consistency and reducing computational burden, we
predict model parameter belief updates using MC-dropouts, a problem previously tackled with
networks ensembles. Lastly, inspired by neuromodulatory mechanisms in biological agents, we
introduce a top-down mechanism that modulates precision over state transitions, which enhances
learning of latent representations.
In what follows, we briefly review active inference. This is followed by a description of our deep
active inference agent. We then evaluate the performance of this agent. Finally, we discuss the
potential implications of this work.
2 Active Inference
Agents defined under active inference: A) sample their environment and calibrate their internal
generative model to best explain sensory observations (i.e., reduce surprise) and B) perform actions
under the objective of reducing their uncertainty about the environment. A more formal definition
requires a set of random variables: st to represent the hidden state of the world at time t, ot as the
corresponding observation, pi = {a1, a2, ..., aT } as a sequence of actions (typically referred to as
‘policy’ in the active inference literature) up to a given time horizon T ∈ N+, and P (ot, st; θ) as the
agent’s generative model parameterized by θ. From this, the agent’s surprise at time t can be defined
as the negative log-likelihood − logP (ot; θ).
To address objective A) under this formulation, the surprise of current observations can be indirectly
minimized by optimizing the parameters, θ, using as a loss function the tractable expression:
− logPθ(ot; θ) ≤ EQ(st)
[
logQ(st)− logP (ot, st; θ)
]
, (1)
where Q(s) is an arbitrary distribution of s. The RHS expression of this inequality is the variational
free energy at time t. This quantity is commonly referred to as negative evidence lower bound [18]
in variational inference. Furthermore, to realize objective B), the expected surprise of future
observations− logP (oτ |θ) where τ ≥ t− can be minimized by selecting the policy that is associated
with the lowest EFE, G [19]:
G(pi, τ) = EP (oτ |sτ ,θ)EQ(sτ ,θ|pi)
[
logQ(sτ , θ|pi)− logP (oτ , sτ , θ|pi)
]
. (2)
Finally, the process of action selection in active inference is realized as sampling from the distribution
P (pi) = σ
(− γG(pi)) = σ(− γ∑
τ>t
G(pi, τ)
)
, (3)
where γ is a temperature parameter and σ(·) the standard softmax function.
3 Deep Active Inference Architecture
In this section, we introduce a deep active inference model using neural networks, based on amortiza-
tion and MC sampling.
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Figure 1: A: Schematic of model architecture and networks used during the learning process. Black
arrows represent the generative model (P ), orange arrows the recognition model (Q), and the green
arrow the top-down attention (ω). B: Relevant quantities for the calculation of EFE G, computed
by simulating the future using the generative model and ancestral sampling. Where appropriate,
expectations are taken with a single MC sample. C: MCTS scheme used for planning and acting,
using the habitual network to selectively explore new tree branches.
Throughout this section, we denote the parameters of the generative and recognition densities with θ
and φ, respectively. The parameters are partitioned as follows: θ = {θo, θs}, where θo parameterizes
the observation function P (ot|st; θo), and θs parameterizes the transition function P (sτ |st, at; θs).
For the recognition density, φ = {φs, φa}, where φs is the amortization parameters of the approximate
posterior Qφs(st) (i.e., the state encoder), and φa the amortization parameters of the approximate
posterior Qφa(a) (i.e., our habitual network).
3.1 Calculating variational and expected free energy
First, we extend the probabilistic graphical model (as defined in Sec. 2) to include the action sequences
pi and factorize the model based on Fig. 1A. We then exploit standard variational inference machinery
to calculate the free energy for each time-step t as:
Ft =− EQ(st)
[
logP (ot|st; θo)
]
+DKL
[
Qφs(st) ‖ P (st|st−1, at−1; θs)
]
+ EQ(st)
[
DKL
[
Qφa(at) ‖ P (at)
]]
,
(4)
where
P (a) =
∑
pi:a1=a
P (pi) (5)
is the summed probability of all policies that begin with action a. We assume that st is normally dis-
tributed and ot is Bernoulli distributed, with all parameters given by a neural network, parameterized
by θo, θs, and φs for the observation, transition, and encoder models, respectively (see Sec. 3.2 for
details about Qφa ). With this assumption, all the terms here are standard log-likelihood and KL terms
easy to compute for Gaussian and Bernoulli distributions. The expectations over Qφs(st) are taken
via MC sampling, using a single sample from the encoder.
Next, we consider EFE. At time-step t and for a time horizon up to time T , EFE is defined as [4]:
G(pi) =
T∑
τ=t
G(pi, τ) =
T∑
τ=t
EQ˜
[
logQ(sτ , θ|pi)− log P˜ (oτ , sτ , θ|pi)
]
, (6)
where Q˜ = Q(oτ , sτ , θ|pi) and P˜ (oτ , sτ , θ|pi) = P (oτ )Q(sτ |oτ )P (θ|sτ , oτ ). Following Schwarten-
beck et al. [20], the EFE of a single time instance τ can be further decomposed as
G(pi, τ) =− EQ˜
[
logP (oτ |pi)
]
(7a)
+ EQ˜
[
logQ(sτ |pi)− logP (sτ |oτ , pi)
]
(7b)
+ EQ˜
[
logQ(θ|sτ , pi)− logP (θ|sτ , oτ , pi)
]
. (7c)
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Interestingly, each term constitutes a conceptually meaningful expression. The term (7a) corresponds
to the likelihood assigned to the desired observations oτ , and plays an analogous role to the notion
of reward in the reinforcement learning literature [21]. The term (7b) corresponds to the mutual
information between the agent’s beliefs about its latent representation of the world, before and after
making a new observation, and hence, it reflects a motivation to explore areas of the environment that
resolve state uncertainty. Similarly, the term (7c) describes the tendency of active inference agents to
reduce their uncertainty about model parameters via new observations and is usually referred to in
the literature as active learning [3], novelty, or curiosity [20].
However, two of the three terms that constitute EFE cannot be easily computed as written in Eq. (7).
To make computation practical, we will re-arrange these expressions and make further use of MC
sampling to render these expressions tractable and re-write Eq. (7) as
G(pi, τ) =− EQ(θ|pi)Q(sτ |θ,pi)Q(oτ |sτ ,θpi)
[
logP (oτ |pi)
]
(8a)
+ EQ(θ|pi)
[
EQ(oτ |θ,pi)H(sτ |oτ , pi)−H(sτ |pi)
]
(8b)
+ EQ(θ|pi)Q(sτ |θ,pi)H(oτ |sτ , θ, pi)− EQ(sτ |pi)H(oτ |sτ , pi) , (8c)
where these expressions can be calculated from the deep neural network illustrated in Fig. 1B. The
derivation of Eq. (8) can be found in the supplementary material. To calculate the terms (8a) and (8b),
we sample θ, sτ and oτ sequentially (through ancestral sampling) and then oτ is compared with the
prior distribution logP (oτ |pi) = logP (oτ ). The parameters of the neural network θ are sampled from
Q(θ) using the MC dropout technique [22]. Similarly, to calculate the expectation of H(oτ |sτ , pi),
the same drawn θ is used again and sτ is re-sampled for N times while, for H(oτ |sτ , θ, pi), the set of
parameters θ is also re-sampled N times. Finally, all entropies can be computed using the standard
formulas for multivariate Gaussian and Bernoulli distributions.
3.2 Action selection and the habitual network
In active inference, agents choose an action given by their EFE. In particular, any given action
is selected with a probability proportional to the accumulated negative EFE of the corresponding
policies G(pi) (see Eq. (3) and Ref. [19]). However, computing G across all policies is costly since
it involves making an exponentially-increasing number of predictions for T -steps into the future,
and computing all the terms in Eq. (8). To solve this problem, we employ two methods operating in
tandem. First, we employ standard MCTS [23–25], a search algorithm in which different potential
future trajectories of states are explored in the form of a search tree (Fig. 1C), giving emphasis to
the most likely future trajectories. This algorithm is used to calculate the distribution over actions
P (a), defined in Eq. (5), and control the agent’s final decisions. Second, we make use of amortized
inference through a habitual neural network that directly approximates the distribution over actions,
which we parameterize by φa and denote Qφa(a). In essence, Qφa(a) acts as a variational posterior
that approximates P (a|st), with a prior P (a), calculated by MCTS (see Fig. 1A). During learning,
this network is trained to reproduce the last executed action at−1 (selected by sampling P (a)) using
the last state st−1. Since both tasks used in this paper (Sec. 4) have discrete action spaces A, we
define Qφa(a) as a neural network with parameters φa and |A| softmax output units.
During the MCTS process, the agent generates a weighted search tree iteratively that is later sam-
pled during action selection. In each single MCTS loop, one plausible state-action trajectory
(st, at, st+1, at+1, ..., sτ , aτ ) – starting from the present time-step t – is calculated. For states
that are explored for the first time, the distribution P (st+1|st, at; θs) is used. States that have been
explored are stored in the buffer search tree and accessed during later loops of the same planning
process. The weights of the search tree G˜(a, s) represent the agent’s best estimation for EFE after
taking action a from state s. An upper confidence bound for G(a, s) is defined as
U(s, a) = G˜(s, a) + cexplore ·Qφa(a|s) ·
1
1 +N(a, s)
, (9)
where N(a, s) is the number of times that a was explored from state s, and cexplore a hyper-parameter
that controls exploration. In each round, the EFE of the newly-explored parts of the trajectory is
calculated and back-propagated to all visited nodes of the search tree. Additionally, actions are
sampled in two ways. Actions from states that have been explored are sampled from σ(U(a, st))
while actions from new states are sampled from Qφa(a).
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Finally, the actions ai that assemble the selected policy are drawn from P (a) =
N(ai,s)∑
j N(aj ,s)
. In our
implementation, the planning loop stops if either the process has identified a clear option (i.e. if
maxP (a)− 1/|A| > Tdec) or the maximum number of allowed loops has been reached.
Through the combination of the approximation Qφa(a) and the MCTS, our agent has at its disposal
two methods of action selection. We refer to Qφa(a) as the habitual network, as it corresponds to a
form of fast decision-making, quickly evaluating and selecting a action; in contrast with the more
deliberative system that includes future imagination via MC tree traversals [26].
3.3 State precision and top-down attention
One of the key elements of our framework is the state transition model P (st|st−1, at−1; θs), that
belongs to the agent’s generative model. In our implementation, we take st ∼ N (µ, σ2/ω), where µ
and σ come from the linear and softplus units (respectively) of a neural network with parameters θs
applied to st−1, and, importantly, ω is a precision factor (c.f. Fig. 1A) modulating the uncertainty on
the agent’s estimate of the hidden state of the environment [8]. We model the precision factor as a
simple function of the belief update about the agent’s current policy,
ω =
a
1 + e−
D−b
c
+ d , (10)
where D = DKL
[
Qφa(a) ‖ P (a)
]
and {a, b, c, d} are fixed hyper-parameters. Note that ω is a
monotonically decreasing function of D, such that when the posterior belief about the current policy
is similar to the prior, precision is high.
In cognitive terms, ω can be thought of as a means of top-down attention [27], that regulates
which transitions should be learnt in detail and which can be learnt less precisely. This attention
mechanism acts as a form of resource allocation: if DKL
[
Qφa(a) ‖ P (a)
]
is high, then a habit has
not yet been formed, reflecting a generic lack of knowledge. Therefore, the precision of the prior
P (st|st−1, at−1; θs) (i.e., the belief about the current state before a new observation ot has been
received) is low, and less effort is spent learning Qφs(st).
In practice, the effect of ω is to incentivize disentanglement in the latent state representation st – the
precision factor ω is somewhat analogous to the β parameter in β-VAE [28], effectively pushing the
state encoder Qφs(st) to have independent dimensions (since P (st|st−1, at−1; θs) has a diagonal
covariance matrix). As training progresses and the habitual network becomes a better approximation
of P (a), ω is gradually increased, implementing a natural form of precision annealing.
4 Results
First, we present the two environments that were used to validate our agent’s performance.
Dynamic dSprites We defined a simple 2D environment based on the dSprites dataset [29, 28].
This was used to i) quantify the agent’s behavior against ground truth state-spaces and ii) evaluate the
agent’s ability to disentangle state representations. This is feasible as the dSprites data is designed for
characterizing disentanglement, using a set of interpretable, independent ground-truth latent factors.
In this task, which we call object sorting, the agent controls the position of the object via 4 different
actions (right, left, up or down) and is required to sort single objects based on their shape (a latent
factor). The agent receives reward when it moves the object across the bottom border, and the reward
value depends on the shape and location as depicted in Fig. 2A. For the results presented in Section 4,
the agent was trained in an on-policy fashion, with a batch size of 100.
Animal-AI We used a variation of ‘preferences’ task from the Animal-AI environment [30]. The
complexity of this, partially observable, 3D environment is the ideal test-bed for showcasing the
agent’s reward-directed exploration of the environment, whilst avoiding negative reward or getting
stuck in corners. In addition, to test the agent’s ability to rely on its internal model, we used a
lights-off variant of this task, with temporary suspension of visual input at any given time-step with
probability R. For the results presented in Section 4, the agent was trained in an off-policy fashion
due to computational constraints. The training data for this was created using a simple rule: move in
the direction of the greenest pixels.
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Figure 2: A: The proposed object sorting task based on the dSprites dataset. The agent can perform 4
actions; changing the position of the object in both axis. Reward is received if an object crosses the
bottom boarder and differs for the 3 object shapes. B: Prediction of the visual observations under
motion if input is hidden in both (i) AnimalAI and (ii) dynamic dSprites environments.
In the experiments that follow, we encode the actual reward from both environments as the prior
distribution of future expected observations logP (oτ ) or, in active inference terms, the expected
outcomes. We optimized the networks using ADAM [31], with loss given in Eq. (4) and an extra
regularization term DKL
[
Qφs(st) ‖ N(0, 1)
]
. The explicit training procedure is detailed in the
supplementary material. The complete source-code, data, and pre-trained agents, is available on
GitHub (https://github.com/zfountas/deep-active-inference-mc).
4.1 Learning environment dynamics and task performance
We initially show – through a simple visual demonstration (Fig. 2B) – that agents learn the environ-
ment dynamics with or without consistent visual input for both dynamic dSprites and AnimalAI. This
is further investigated, for the dynamic dSprites, by evaluating task performance (Fig. 3A-C), as well
as reconstruction loss for both predicted visual input and reward (Fig. 3D-E) during training.
To explore the effect of using different EFE functionals on behavior, we trained and compared active
inference agents under three different formulations, all of which used the implicit reward function
logP (oτ ), against a baseline reward-maximizing agent. These include i) beliefs about the latent
states (i.e., terms a,b from Eq. 7), ii) beliefs about both the latent states and model parameters (i.e.,
complete Eq. 7) and iii) beliefs about the latent states, with a down-weighted reward signal. We found
that, although all agents exhibit similar performance in collecting rewards (Fig. 3B), active inference
agents have a clear tendency to explore the environment (Fig. 3C). Interestingly, our results also
demonstrate that all three formulations are better at reconstructing the expected reward, in comparison
to a reward-maximizing baseline (Fig. 3D). Additionally, our agents are capable of reconstructing the
current observation, as well as predicting 5 time-steps into the future, for all formulations of EFE,
with similar loss with the baseline (Fig. 3E).
4.2 Disentanglement and transition learning
Disentanglement of latent spaces leads to lower dimensional temporal dynamics that are easier
to predict [32]. Thus, generating a disentangled latent space s can be beneficial for learning the
parameters of the transition function P (sτ |st, at; θs). Due to the similarity between the precision
term ω and the hyper-parameter β in β-VAE [28] discussed in Sec. 3.3, we hypothesized that ω could
play an important role in regulating transition learning. To explore this hypothesis, we compared the
total correlation (as a metric for disentanglement [33]) of latent state beliefs between i) agents that
have been trained with the different EFE functionals, ii) the baseline (reward-maximizing) agent, iii)
an agent trained without top-down attention (although the average value of ω was maintained), as
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Figure 3: Agent’s performance during on-policy training in the object sorting task. A: Comparison
of different action selection strategies for the agent driven by the full Eq. (8). B-C: Comparison of
agents driven by different functionals, limited to state estimations of a single step into the future. In
C, the violin plots represent behavior driven by P (a) (the planner) and the gray box plots driven by
the habitual network Qφa(a). D-F: Reconstruction loss and total correlation during learning for 4
different functionals.
well as iv) a simple variational autoencoder that received the same visual inputs. As seen in Fig. 3F,
all active inference agents using ω generated structures with significantly more disentanglement (see
traversals in supp. material). Indeed, the performance ranking here is the same as in Fig. 3D, pointing
to disentanglement as a possible reason for the performance difference in predicting rewards.
4.3 Navigation and planning in reward-based tasks
The training process in the dynamic dSprites environment revealed two types of behavior. Initially,
we see epistemic exploration (i.e., curiosity), that is overtaken by reward seeking (i.e., goal-directed
behavior) once the agent is reasonably confident about the environment. An example of this can be
seen in the left trajectory plot in Fig. 4Ai, where the untrained agent – with no concept of reward
– deliberates between multiple options and chooses the path that enables it to quickly move to the
next round. The same agent, after 700 learning iterations, can now optimally plan where to move
the current object, in order to maximize potential reward, logP (oτ ). We next investigated the
sensitivity when deciding, by changing the threshold Tdec. We see that changing the threshold has
clear implications for the distribution of explored alternative trajectories i.e., number of simulated
states (Fig. 4Aii). This plays an important role in the performance, with maximum performance
found at Tdec ≈ 0.8 (Fig. 4Aiii).
Agents trained in the Animal-AI environment also exhibit interesting (and intelligent) behavior. Here,
the agent is able to make complex plans, by avoiding obstacles with negative reward and approaching
expected outcomes (red and green objects respectively, Fig. 4Bi). Maximum performance can be
found for 16 MCTS loops and Tdec ≈ 0.1 (Fig. 4Bii; details in the supplementary material). When
deployed in ’lights-off’ experiments, the agent can successfully maintain an accurate representation of
the world state and simulate future plans despite temporary suspension of visual input (Fig. 2B). This
is particularly interesting because P (st+1|st, at; θs) is defined as a feed-forward network, without
the ability to maintain memory of states before t. As expected, the agent’s ability to operate in this
set-up becomes progressively worse the longer the visual input is removed, while shorter decision
thresholds are found to preserve performance longer (Fig. 4Biii).
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Figure 4: Agent’s planning performance. A: Dynamic dSprites. i) Example planned trajectory plots
with number of visits per state (blue-pink color map) and the selected policy (black lines). ii) The
effect of decision threshold Tdec on the number of simulated states and iii) the agent’s performance. B:
Animal-AI. i) Same as in A. ii) System performance over hyper-parameters and iii) in the lights-off
task. Error bars in Aiii denote standard deviation and in B standard error of the mean.
5 Concluding Remarks
The attractiveness of active inference inherits from the biological plausibility of the framework [4, 34,
35]. Accordingly, we focused on scaling-up active inference inspired by neurobiological structure
and function that supports intelligence. This is reflected in the hierarchical generative model, where
the higher-level policy network contextualizes lower-level state representations. This speaks to a
separation of temporal scales afforded by cortical hierarchies in the brain and provides a flexible
framework to develop biologically-inspired intelligent agents.
We introduced MCTS for tackling planning problems with vast search spaces [23, 36, 24, 37, 38].
This approach builds upon Çatal et al.’s [39] deep active inference proposal, to use tree search to
recursively re-evaluate EFE for each policy, but is computationally more efficient. Additionally, using
MCTS offers an Occam’s window for policy pruning; that is, we stop evaluating a policy path if
its EFE becomes much higher than a particular upper confidence bound. This pruning drastically
reduces the number of paths one has to evaluate. It is also consistent with biological planning, where
agents adopt brute force exploration of possible paths in a decision tree, up to a resource-limited
finite depth [40]. This could be due to imprecise evidence about different future trajectories [41]
where environmental constraints subvert evaluation accuracy [42, 43] or alleviate computational
load [44]. Previous work addressing the depth of possible future trajectories in human subjects under
changing conditions shows that both increased cognitive load [43] and time constraints [45, 46, 42]
reduce search depth. Huys et al. [44] highlighted that in tasks involving alleviated computational
load, subjects might evaluate only subsets of decision trees. This is consistent with our experiments
as the agent selects to evaluate only particular trajectories based on their prior probability to occur.
We have shown that the precision factor, ω, can be used to incorporate uncertainty over the prior
and enhances disentanglement by encouraging statistical independence between features [47–50].
This is precisely why it has been associated with attention [51]; a signal that shapes uncertainty [52].
Attention enables flexible modulation of neural activity that allows behaviorally relevant sensory data
to be processed more efficiently [53, 54, 27]. The neural realizations of this have been linked with
neuromodulatory systems, e.g., cholinergic and noradrenergic [55–59]. In active inference, they have
been associated specifically with noradrenaline for modulating uncertainty about state transitions [8],
noradrenergic modulation of visual attention [60] and dopamine for policy selection [4, 60].
A limitation of this work lies in its comparison to reward-maximizing agents. That is, if the specific
goal is to maximize reward, then it is not clear whether deep active inference (i.e., full specification
of EFE) has any performance benefits over simple reward-seeking agents (i.e., using only Eq. 7a). We
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emphasize, however, that the primary purpose of the active inference framework is to serve as a model
for biological cognition, and not as an optimal solution for reward-based tasks. Therefore, we have
deliberately not focused on bench-marking performance gains against state-of-the-art reinforcement
learning agents, although we hypothesize that insights from active inference could prove useful in
complex environments where either reward maximization isn’t the objective, or in instances where
direct reward maximization leads to sub-optimal performance.
There are several extensions that can be explored, such as testing whether performance would increase
with more complex, larger neural networks, e.g., using LSTMs to model state transitions. One could
also assess if including episodic memory would finesse EFE evaluation over a longer time horizon,
without increasing computational complexity. Future work should also test how performance shifts if
the objective of the task changes. Lastly, it might be neurobiologically interesting to see whether the
generated disentangled latent structures are apt for understanding functional segregation in the brain.
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7 Supplementary material
7.1 Expected free energy derivation
Here, we provide the steps needed to derive Eq. (8) from Eq. (7). The term (7b) can be re-written as:
EQ˜
[
logQ(sτ |pi)− logQ(sτ |oτ , pi)
]
=
= EQ(θ|pi)Q(sτ |θ,pi)Q(oτ |sτ ,θ,pi)
[
logQ(sτ |pi)− logQ(sτ |oτ , pi)
]
= EQ(θ|pi)
[
EQ(sτ |θ,pi) logQ(sτ |pi)− EQ(sτ ,oτ |θ,pi) logQ(sτ |oτ , pi)
]
= EQ(θ|pi)
[
EQ(oτ |θ,pi)H(sτ |oτ , pi)−H(sτ |pi)
]
,
where we have only used the definition Q˜ = Q(oτ , sτ , θ|pi), and the definition of the standard (and
conditional) Shannon entropy.
Next, the term (7c) can be re-written as:
EQ˜
[
logQ(θ|sτ , pi)− logQ(θ|sτ , oτ , pi)
]
=
= EQ(sτ ,θ,oτ |pi)
[
logQ(oτ |sτ , pi)− logQ(oτ |sτ , θ, pi)
]
= EQ(sτ |pi)Q(oτ |sτ ,pi) logQ(oτ |sτ , pi)
− EQ(θ|pi)Q(sτ |θ,pi)Q(oτ |sτ ,θpi) logQ(oτ |sτ , θ, pi)
= EQ(θ|pi)Q(sτ |θ,pi)H(oτ |sτ , θ, pi)− EQ(sτ |pi)H(oτ |sτ , pi) ,
where the first equality is obtained via a normal Bayes inversion, and the second via the factorization
of Q˜.
7.2 Training Procedure
The model presented here was implemented in Python and the library TensorFlow 2.0. We initialized
3 different ADAM optimizers, which we used in parallel, to allow learning parameters with different
rates. The networks Qφs , Pθo were optimized using an initial learning rate of 10
−3 and, as a loss
function, the first two terms of Eq. (4). In experiments where regularization was used, the loss
function used by this optimizer was adjusted to
Lφs,θo =− EQ(st)
[
logP (ot|st; θo)
]
+ γDKL
[
Qφs(st) ‖ P (st|st−1, at−1; θs)
]
+ (1− γ)DKL
[
Qφs(st) ‖ N(0, 1)
]
,
(11)
where γ is a hyper parameter, starting with value 0 and gradually increasing to 0.8. In our experiments,
we found that the effect of regularization is only to improve the speed of convergence and not the
behavior of the agent and, thus, it can be safely omitted.
The parameters of the network Pθs were optimized using a rate of 10
−4 and only the second term of
Eq. (4) as a loss. Finally, the parameters of Qφa were optimized with a learning rate of 10
−4 and
only the final term of Eq. (4) as a loss. For all presented experiments and learning curves, batch size
was set to 50. A learning iteration is defined as 1000 optimization steps with new data generated from
the corresponding environment.
In order to learn to plan further into the future, the agents were trained to map transitions every 5
simulation time-steps in dynamic dSprites and 3 simulation time-steps in Animal-AI. Finally, the
runtime of the results presented here is as follows. For the agents in the dynamic dSprites environment,
training of the final version of the agents took approximately 26 hours per version (on-policy, 700
learning iterations) using an NVIDIA Titan RTX GPU. Producing the learning and performance
curves in Fig. 3, took 10 hours per agent when the 1-step and habitual strategies were employed
and approximately 4 days when the full MCTS planner was used (Fig. 3A). For the Animal-AI
environment, off-policy training took approximately 9 hours per agent, on-policy training took 8 days
and, the results presented in Fig. 4 took approximately 4 days, using an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1660
super GPU (CPU: i7-4790k, RAM: 16GB DDR3).
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7.3 Model parameters
In both simulated environments, the network structure used was almost identical, consisting of
convolutional, deconvolutional, fully-connected and dropout layers (Fig. 5). In both cases, the
dimensionality of the latent space s was 10. For the top-down attention mechanism, the parameters
used were a = 2, b = 0.5, c = 0.1 and d = 5 for the Animal-AI environment and a = 1, b = 25, c =
5 and d = 1.5 for dynamic dSprites. The action space was |A| = 3 for Animal-AI and |A| = 4 for
dynamic dSprites. Finally, with respect to the planner, we set cexplore = 1 in both cases, Tdec = 0.8
(when another value is not specifically mentioned), the depth of MCTS simulation rollouts was set
to 3, while the maximum number of MCTS loops was set to 300 for dynamic dSprites and 100 for
Animal-AI.
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Figure 5: Neural network parameters used for the dynamic dSprites experiments. For the Animal-AI
experiments, the only differences are: i) the input layer of the network used for Qφs(s) and output
layer for P (o|s; θo) have shape (32, 32, 3), ii) the input layer of P (st+1|st, at; θs) has shape (10+3)
and iii) the output layer of Qφa(a) has a shape of (3), corresponding to the three actions forward, left
and right.
7.4 Examples of agent plans
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A) Learning iteration: 2
B) Learning iteration: 700
Figure 6: Examples of consecutive plans in the dynamic dSprites environment during a single
experiment.
Figure 7: Examples of plans in Animal-AI environment. Examples were picked randomly.
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7.5 Examples of traversals
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Figure 8: Latent space traversals for the full active inference agent trained in the dynamic dSprites
environment. Histograms represent distribution of values for 1000 random observations. The
graphs on the right column represent Spearman’s correlation between each dimension of s and the 5
continuous ground truth features of the environment. This includes the 4 continuous features of the
dSprites dataset and reward, encoded in the top pixels shown in s9. Although correlation with shape
types is not shown, as this is a categorical feature, the traversals of s8 illustrate that this dimension
encodes shape.
16
